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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the University of Miami, in 
cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which concluded in the Summer 
of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention was to submit proposals for a new framework and process of restructuring the 
European Union.  While the European Union has been successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the 
European Union must take more modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its 
objectives at home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention were Europe’s role in the international community, 
the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process.  In order for efficiency and progress to 
prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of 
this organization.  As the member states negotiate the details of the draft constitutional treaty, the Jean Monnet/Robert 
Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete information on current Convention issues but also analyze 
various aspects of and actors involved in this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How did the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union necessarily have to 
understand each other?  Under what conditions? 
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
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STRATEGIC HEMISPHERIC OBJECTIVES  





I would like to emphasize how much I was impressed by the opening speeches by Commander in 
Chief General J.T. Hill and R. Millett, by their approach and analysis which are largely similar, 
or compatible with views in the European Union, which I shall present. On certain things we 
may put the emphasis differently, or even disagree. But on one thing we agree: there needs to be 
a better, broader dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic. This conference, I understand, is 
held in that spirit. I welcome this opportunity to contribute to it. 
 
The European Union in the World 
  
The Unitd States is the only military superpower in the world today, due to its huge budget for 
defence spending, 750 bases in the world, and its technological advantage. The United States has 
enormous power and influence, but not unlimited: military power is indispensable in certain 
situations, but does not solve political or social problems. The United States is also very strong 
economically, but not nearly so dominant. The  European Union has a similar GDP, is an equal 
trading power. Also, East Asia holds 70% of foreign currency reserves. In addition,  the United 
States has ballooning deficits. 
 
  In his afterword to "American power and the crisis of legitimacy", R. Kagan comes to the 
conclusion that: "Europe is too weak to be an essential ally, and it is too secure to be a potential 
victim". There is much truth in this quote, just like in the following one, again from Kagan: 
"Europe matters because Europe and the United States remain the heart of the liberal, democratic 
world. The liberal, democratic essence of the United States makes it difficult, if not impossible 
for the Americans to ignore the fears, concerns, interests and demands of its fellow liberal 
democracies."  The European Union may not be a global power, but it is a global player, a power 
in the world.   True, the European Union continues to punch below its weight in the United 
Nations and the international financial institutions. The European Union provides 37% of the 
UN's regular budget and around 50% of all UN Member States' contributions to UN funds, 
programs and agencies. Its impact is not commensurate with this level of contribution. 
  
  With 25 Member States, the Union will comprise 15% of the membership of the United 
Nations. It is uniquely placed to formulate, agree and carry forward joint positions in the United 
Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions.  EU-25 is potentially a world player, an actor ready 
to share in the responsibility for global security. Having listened to the earlier speeches on the 
positions of individual European states on Latin America, I stress that in this field, too, the total 
is more than the sum of its parts. 
 
On the economic level, the European Union is already a global player with its population 
of 450 million, its GDP equal to 25 % of the world. The European Union is the leading trading 
power, the first global donor of official development aid (ODA), with 26 billion USD in 2001 
                                                           
1 Luncheon Speech at the U.S. Army War College Conference, Miami – March 17-19, 2004.   4 
compared to the US 11.4, as well as of humanitarian aid (47% of global assistance vs. US36%). 
In this context, it is  noteworthy that unlike some other donors, the European Union does not see 
ODA as a means of securing short-term foreign policy objectives. Note also that unlike US aid, 
EU "aid" refers only to development assistance and does not include military or private 
international assistance.  
 
In Latin America, the European Union is the first or second trading partner for all 
countries. From 1990 till 2002, EU imports from Latin America increased from 26,7 to 53,7 
billion Euros, and exports to Latin America rose from 17,1 to 57,5.  With the obvious exception   
of Mexico, the European Union is the first investor, particularly in nontraditional sectors, thus 
allowing for considerable added value in the countries. After a peak in 2000, European FDI 
diminished; however, the total stock grew from 176,5 billion to 206,1 billion Euros. The 
European Union is by far the most important donor of civil aid, more than the United States and 
Japan together (about 60%). Since 1996, the EC budget alone (i.e. without individual donations 
from the 15 Member States) has totalled more than 500 million per year. Latin America receives 
three times more EU aid per capita than other developing areas in the world. To quote the 
recently adopted European Security Strategy -ESS-: Trade and development policies can be 
powerful tools for promoting reform. The European Union and the  Member States are well 
placed to pursue both goals, trade  and  aid. 
 
  The European Union is also a powerful political actor, although it still has some way to go, 
even more so as concerns military capacities. I shall therefore concentrate more on non-military  
policies. To put it simple: the European Union certainly has far more carrot than stick capacities 
- but not just because of lack of the latter. It is also a matter of approach. And there is an intrinsic 
value in being a non-military power.  Take as an example the EU's  role together with some Latin 
American partners in putting an end to civil wars in Central America and in the post-conflict 
area. In  our relations with Latin America – including with more "difficult " partners –  whenever 
possible, we prefer dialogue, persuasion, cooperation, yet we are not naïve: dialogue does not 
always settle problems in this complex world. But, I dare a pun: rather than denouncing an "axis 
of evil", we try to get "access to evil" to change things. Where the United States sees a dangerous 
world, many in the European Union, until recently, saw a complex world. But it is also true that a 
large part of the EU population was somewhat unclear if it really wanted a multipolar world or 
one  led by the United States, with the European Union in a privileged position.  
 
The New Situation in Latin America 
 
Various speakers described and analysed  the important evolutions in Latin America since the 
early 1990's, so I can limit myself to highlighting the essential aspects. Democracy has become 
the normal way of  installing governments and doing politics. Latin America has made enormous 
efforts in opening its economies to the world. They have the right to expect now that 
globalisation is not a zero-sum game. Latin American countries strongly assert themselves 
politically as a region striving for an active, independent role including as a global actor and the 
European Union supported this from the start. We seem even to be more confident than some 
Latin American speakers at this conference. Let me stress in this context the coordination 
between the European Union and Latin American countries on a number of matters of common   5 
interest in international fora, in particular the UN system; they are becoming more and more 
regular exercises to sound out common ground. 
  
  There are, however, persistent shortcomings which obviously start having an impact on the 
security situation: continued grave social inequality and exclusion, suboptimal economic 
interrelatedness; regional integration processes seem  more advanced in Presidential declarations 
than on the ground. 
  
 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) - The Voice of the European Union  
on Security Matters 
  
We sometimes forget that our ambition to build a common foreign and security policy is still in 
the early stage. We began this task only in 1993, with the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Being a relative newcomer on the global scene, drawbacks were regrettable, but not 
altogether unexpected. They did not prove that a common foreign policy is impossible, they 
showed how badly we needed one! The European Security Strategy is a direct response to that 
conclusion. We did our homework, and we have achieved a lot in a short time. In the security 
field, we have "someone whom you can phone when you want to talk to Europe", the High 
Representative Javier Solana. We have created new structures, including our Institute for 
Strategic Studies, and developed new capabilities. We have deployed those capabilities in the 
field, in the Western Balkans and in Africa. We have moved from a phase of theory to a phase of 
practice. The ESS  is the result of a remarkable convergence of views on security issues between 
EU Member States, coming from various historical backgrounds and with  a vast array of 
government coalitions and public opinions on military matters. An authentic and distinctive 
European voice in security issues has been confirmed. 
 
   The old "set" of dangers in the world has been enlarged; not only are we confronted with 
failed or failing states, but new dangers are found in the combinations of threats: terrorism 
capitalising on the persistence of regional conflicts; criminal organisations acquiring weapons of 
mass destruction, whether through theft or collaboration with  States, or through  collapse of 
State structures; collusion between fundamentalists, cyber-terrorists and international criminal 
organisations. Distant threats have the potential to gravely affect Europe's security. There are no 
more borders – neither for threats and crises, nor for solidarity and the shared will to create an 
other world. 
 
   The geo-strategic scene has been transformed. The process we describe as "globalisation" has 
facilitated the easy movement of people, goods and ideas, but also of grievances, criminality and 
weapons. I strongly recommend reading the report of the ILO Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalisation, recently published. The Union has not stood impassive as the world 
around it changes. The imminent enlargement of the Union is itself a response to the 
contemporary challenges, reinforcing political stability and economic security on our own 
continent. One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship.  
This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole.  
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  What are the major elements of the ESS ? 
 
 1.  Responsibility: as the European Union grows, we have a duty to assume our 
responsibilities for security – to our own citizens, to our neighbours and, more widely, for global 
security. We could, in theory, walk away from these responsibilities – but we could not escape 
the consequences of doing so. The recent horrible attacks in Spain showed EU countries are now 
part of the terrorist battlefield. 
 
 2.  Neighbourhood: I would not go into it here, but for an enlarged European Union, 
countries such as Georgia - I mean not the lovely US state next door - are neither remote nor 
distant. 
 
 3.  Effective multilateralism: it is not enough to say we support multilateralism. We must be 
prepared to make it work. Making it work means extending the scope of international law. It 
means reforming and strengthening multilateral institutions.  Kissinger's recommendation  is 
right, but not only for the US policy: "The dominant trend in American foreign policy must be to 
transform power into consensus, so that the international order is based on agreement rather than 
reluctant acquiescence."  
 
  You are aware that the European Union is strongly in favour of promoting rule-based order 
through international law.  Effective multilateralism requires a strong commitment to upholding, 
developing and implementing international law. It has an indispensable role to play in fostering 
good governance and domestic rule of law, thereby making an important contribution to prevent 
state failure; it helps to address the inter-related problems of conflict, poverty, underdevelopment 
and the absence of human security.  Where international order is based on agreed rules, we must 
be prepared to ensure the respect of these rules when they are broken.  
 
  In this context, a functioning International Criminal Court is also essential for the European 
Union, which strongly encourages Latin American and Caribbean partners to join  us in ensuring 
the principles of universality and integrity of the Rome Statute. Like many of them, we see no 
convincing reason in bilateral non-surrender agreements on the basis of Art.98.  I note with much 
interest General Hill's remarks on counterproductive effects of the U.S. legislation against those 
countries who do not "comply." 
 
  In the light of recurrent financial crises in Latin America, the reform discussion within the 
International Financial Institutions should be strongly supported in view of increasing their 
universal legitimacy and effectiveness. We should consider ways to enhance the voice and 
effective participation of developing and transition countries, for example by rebalancing voting 
powers. To quote the Commission on Social Dimension of Globalization: "There is a serious 
democratic deficit at the heart of the system." Others would say, a need to reform it.  Let me add 
in this context, that the European Union is also examining Latin American and Caribbean 
proposals for international funds supporting democracy or alleviating poverty. 
 
  4. Effective multilateralism also implies fostering closer regional co-operation.  Action, 
coherence and capability will be vital, but will not be enough unless Europe strengthens relations 
with its strategic partners. Threats are never more dangerous than when the international   7 
community is divided. For this reason in particular, the transatlantic link between Europe, the 
United States and Canada is irreplaceable.  For forty  years we were partners for reasons of geo-
political necessity. Today we are partners of choice. As such, we must choose to work together 
to address our shared responsibilities, since none of us, however powerful, can deal with all the 
problems alone. Better co-operation is the key to effective multilateralism, and is our best 
weapon against the threats we jointly face.  Regional organisations also strengthen global 
governance, e.g., ASEAN and MERCOSUR can make an important contribution to a more 
orderly world. We encourage and cooperate with them to do so. 
 
5.  ESS has a comprehensive approach to security; one that pays as much attention to 
the causes of threats as to their consequences. Globalisation brings more freedom and wealth, but 
millions have been excluded from its benefits. Globalisation's potential to generate new 
frustrations must  be addressed. To quote again the Commission on Social Dimension of 
Globalization: "We seek a process of globalization with a strong social dimension based on 
universally shared values, and respect for human rights and individual dignity; one that is fair, 
inclusive, democratically governed and provides opportunities and tangible benefits for all 
countries and people." 
Poverty is not the only source of conflict, nor is it a justification for conflict.  Indeed, 
social research shows that it is rather frustrated expectations that cause rebellion.  But  poverty 
and deprivation are breeding grounds for discontent and anger. A world that is fairer is also a 
world that is more secure. Security is a precondition for development. Democracies do make the 
world safer. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also 
encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible.  
 
  6. A final theme is prevention, a particularly difficult task, but  essential. Today's threats are 
dynamic ones. Left alone, they will become more dangerous. At this conference, various 
speakers referred to Haiti and our common failure to prevent the mounting crisis, or at least to 
intervene at an earlier stage. There was agreement that this should no longer be allowed to 
happen - but reactions from the region show how difficult this is not only on a military level, but 
also because of political sensitivities. I mentioned earlier that the European Union is already 
operative in peacekeeping and police missions, in particular in the Balkans and Africa. In Haiti 
we are in the process of reactivating possibly hundreds of million Euros, some of which had been 
frozen because of persistent violations of human and civil rights in the recent past.  In Latin 
America, the EU 's assistance covers conflict prevention projects notably in the Andean region.  
 
  The European Union  has an  early warning mechanism, a regularly updated watchlist of 
countries.  There is general agreement in the EU institutions and Member States that using all 
policy areas and achieving the appropriate policy mix is key to increasing the Union's impact in 
international affairs. 
 
  Looking ahead: The EU's 2010 Headline Goal actually under discussion,  has the objective 
that in 2010, the European Union should be able to respond with rapid and decisive action in the 
whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the  European Union. 
This would include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping, combat forces including in 
crisis management, joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating   8 
terrorism, and security sector reform. The European Union must be able to act before a crisis 
occurs, and retain the ability to conduct several operations simultaneously.  
 
Security Progress in Latin America 
  
Reading the outcome of the recent OAS Special Conference on Security in Mexico in October, 
2003 shows that our analyses and objectives are very similar. Differences lay mainly in 
capacities, instruments or some priorities. I noted that some speakers considered the outcome as 
insufficiently operational. To be honest, at the European Union level, there are few contacts with 
Latin America on security, and mostly in the past. (But even US SOUTH COM Chief General 
Hill complained he had to operate with a mere 0.22% of the defense budget). However, some of 
our Member States are known to have such contacts, to offer advise, help, support and 
intelligence in certain countries, e.g.in Colombia.  A dialogue on confidence-building measures, 
agreed between European Union and RIO Group Ministers in 1994, had a promising start, but 
was put to rest after few high-level seminars.  
 
  In the light of panels 2 and 3, I need not go into details on  progress on security in Latin 
America.  We strongly appreciate the commitments of all Latin American countries, such as  to 
the Tlatelolco Treaty, making it a denuclearized region. The European Union has given support 
to the implementation of the Compromiso de Lima (17 June 2002) and the Andean  Charter for 
peace and security and the limitation and control of the expenditure on foreign defence. The 
United Nations Center for peace, disarmament and development in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in Lima, deserves our support. 
 
   Regular conferences of defense ministers of the Americas can be important contributions to 
regional security. Regional confidence-building measures in recent years did substantially 
improve relations and security in the hemisphere, in addition to growing yet insufficient 
economic interrelatedness. Just recall some years ago, during a border conflict between 
Argentina and Chile, energy transfer continued over the Andes just as normal business. This is 
the kind of concrete implementation of the spirit of  joint security perception, Francine Jacome 
was looking for in her panel. 
 
  The European Union has actively participated in the meeting of the UN Department of 
Political Affairs  on Governance of Security sector in Latin America, in early 2003, and will 
continue to do so; in this context, the EU Council Presidency established first contacts with OAS 
in late 2003.  The European Union welcomes and financially supports subregional initiatives, 
such as control and reduction of small arms. This is an important, concrete contribution to 
security - after all, there are  more daily victims  in Latin America by small arms than, as it were, 
by atomic weapons.  What is needed, is that such initiatives in Latin America  are effectively 
implemented. There are some worrying signs of  recent resurgence of some ghosts of the race 
towards armament – this would be the wrong answer to the wrong kind of today's threat 
perception, as other speakers stressed!  
 
  I shall now discuss more in detail, and with examples for certain countries, some aspects of 
how the European Union is dealing with the political, economic and social causes of security 
problems.   9 
 
Fight Against Terrorism 
 
Long before becoming itself a victim of large-scale terrorist acts, the European Union  has 
underlined, with words and actions, its solidarity in the fight against terrorism.  Following 9/11, 
the European Union  regularly assesses risks of terrorism, including in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In recent agreements with third countries, Political Dialogue and/or cooperation on 
terrorism is foreseen. In addition, the European Unioin decided that as an essential clause, non-
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction shall be inserted in future agreements, or added to 
existing ones. The EU's clearing house has a list of what the European Union considers terrorist 
groups. We also have good cooperation with the United States.  In the light of the terrorist 
attacks in Spain, as well as of internal reports - made public - on insufficient use of existing 
instruments, the European Union has taken more concrete steps end of March.  
 
  The European Union is strongly convinced that the fight against terrorism cannot be waged at 
the expense of established, basic, shared values such as respect for human rights and the rule of 
law. Not doing so, risks to prolong or create new conflicts.  This is, for example, the essence of 
the EU's message to Colombia, which was renewed in the EU Council's conclusions on 
Colombia in January 2004, just before President Uribe's visit to Europe. The European Union 
strongly supports President Uribe's efforts for political, economic and social reforms, to develop 
a fully functioning democratic state throughout the territory of Colombia, consistent with the rule 
of law, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and the welfare and safety 
of the citizens of Colombia.  The European Union also fully supports his fight against terrorism, 
illegal drugs and related crimes, and his search for a negotiated solution to the internal armed 
conflict. The European Union reiterates its willingness to assist a peaceful solution, within the 
framework of a comprehensive peace strategy the Government should work out. The European 
Union has actively cooperated at the 10 July London conference of international support for 
Colombia.  In 2003 alone, the EU's non-military contributions  amounted to some 300 million 
Euros, the figures for 1998-2002 are 556 million Euros - which makes us the leading ODA 
donor.  
 
  On the other hand, the European Union recommended to modify the ley alternativa, which 
some wrongly call the law on impunity, and is not at ease with the passing of judicial powers to 
security forces. We consider that the recommendations of the London Conference as well as 
those of the UNHCHR deserve better than being rather selectively followed. There is 
international concern that the paramilitaries are just  trying  to buy their way out politically. Any 
large-scale amnesty, in particular if covering serious crimes, would be a very bad signal not only 
to the FARC and ELN. The European Union asks Colombia to also respect  the rights of victims, 
not because we are bleeding-heart softies, manipulated by NGO's, as some seem to see it, but for 
reasons of sustainability of the peace process and of  the rule of  law. Let's be concrete: 
otherwise, according to reports of the International Crisis Group, paramilitary leaders would be 
on the way to become a new political and economic elite: according to the International Crisis 
Group, in addition to land-stealing by extortion and forced emigration, landbuying has become a  
most effective way of drug money-laundering. In fertile areas, 40% of the best land were 
acquired this way. 
   10  
  Various EU countries are part of the Group of Friends. The European Union strongly 
supports international good services and efforts, notably by the UNSG and the Catholic Church,  
to maintain contacts for a peaceful solution with the illegal armed groups. We cannot but regret 
that actually there is little, or even negative and provocative  response mainly from the FARC. 
As concerns the ELN, contacts are also difficult – it seems to have lost interest or confidence in 
Cuba's mediating role . 
  
  A final word on the listing of terrorist groups. Unlike the FARC and AU, the ELN was not on 
the EU's list, until the EU Council decided so on 4 April 2004. This certainly looked 
inconsistent, but was due to historic circumstances, and linked to hopes for humanitarian 
solutions. We are all in a dilemma: while listing such groups is well founded on moral or 
political grounds and well received by the public, political and humanitarian contacts are nearly 




Drugs are not only a  continuous threat to life and health, but also to democracy and even 
regional security because of the close links between drug cartels and terrorist groups, 
"narcoterrorism". These links exist not only in Latin America. The  European Union is 
committed to the fight against drugs on the basis of principles of co-responsibility, it favors 
positive, i.e. non-repressive action in producing countries, a  global and balanced approach 
tackling both demand and supply . The European Union tries to tackle the problem with various 
instruments and at multiple levels: political or expert dialogue, trade, cooperation. 
 
  The Mechanism for Co-ordination and Cooperation on Drug-related Matters between the 
European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, an initiative that originated at the meeting of 
the European Council in Madrid in December 1995, is  the framework for dialogue to deal with 
the drug problem and related crimes in an effective and consensual way. At the first EU-LAC 
Summit 1999 in Rio, both sides  adopted an action plan.  The Mechanism's 5th high-level 
meeting was held in Cartagena/Colombia on 29-30 May 2003. Over seventy  projects or 
activities  are under way  in this context.   Special attention is given to  four priority areas: 
demand reduction, money laundering, alternative development and maritime cooperation, and to 
control of precursor chemical diversion, criminal networks and exchange of information and 
experiences on new illicit drug trends, in particular synthetic drugs. 
 
  Together with Latin America, we undertake joint efforts to dismantle the components of the 
world drug problem as an important contribution to the fight against terrorism.  Some Latin 
American and Caribbean countries develop relations with Europol and with Eurojust. Recently, 
an agreement was signed between Europol and Colombia.  In addition, the European Union has a 
specialised dialogue and cooperation with the Andean Community: Alternative development 
projects are ongoing in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, a monitoring centre was supported in 
Venezuela. An important project on precursors control is run in the Andean area.  
 
  The  European Union is  more than the United States centred  on  "soft eradication", linked 
with fostering alternative production. Drug cooperation projects with Latin America and the 
Caribbean total some 120Meuros.  Our  Peace Laboratories in Colombia are not just a societal   11  
utopia, but a concrete way of alternative living.  To avoid negative impact for these by  US 
fumigation measures, we established a  functioning dialogue at Bogota.  For many years the 
European Union has granted a Special anti-drug Generalized System of Preferences to the 
Andean and Central American countries. This means in reality, that 70-90% of Andean exports 
already enter the  European Union tax free. 
 
   Dialogue, trade and aid aspects are also essential components in recent agreements with 
Latin America.  We have concluded and put into practice "Association Agreements", which 
include Free Trade Areas, with Mexico and Chile, negotiations with Mercosur are under way and 
should be concluded this year. Central America and the Andean ask for similar agreements. In 
the light of its own experience, we also strongly support regional integration, which  not only 
reinforces a  region's impact on the international playing field, but is also a strong expression of 
confidence, mutual understanding, shared objectives, and more and more important in the fight 
against the mobile drug producers. 
 
   Recent analyses  tend  to confirm the EU's  approach to drugs:  According to the Andes 2020 
study of the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Plan Colombia risks to fail in the long haul, 
with drug production merely shifting to other countries, notably Bolivia.   John Heimann, former 
Comptroller of the U.S. Treasury and one of the report's authors, stressed that security issues, 
drugs, corruption, poor land distribution, income inequalities and other problems need to be 
tackled multilaterally; addressing these issues on a country-by-country basis is doomed to 
failure. Lieutenent General Daniel Christman (retired), senior Vice President for International 
Relations of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said the current plan  did little to prevent 
replanting and affected poor farmers more than rich drug cartels. We share the view of  Peter 
Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue:  Destroying the livelihood of coca growers 
without providing alternatives is likely to be self-defeating and undermining the governments' 
capacity and credibility – including ours!  
 
  Before moving to other subjects, let me stress again our common interest in combating drugs 
everywhere. According to DEA Chief Karen Tandy, U.S. drug users supply the international 
drug trade with 65 billion per year;  the Madrid attacks were financed by hashish trade - in this 
situation, for our own security, we all must focus ever more on demand.  
 
  Economic development, social cohesion, democratisation and regional integration are 
priorities which most thoughtful policy makers in Latin America see as inextricably linked, 
mutually dependent and have an impact on security. There is a certain amount that the European 
Union can do, and does,  to help. But since the focus is on causes, not symptoms, it is absolutely 
clear, and only right, to acknowledge that real change is in the hands of Latin American 
governments’ countries themselves. 
 
Good Governance and Development 
 
The Joint Council and Commission Statement of November 2000 on EC development policy 
identified institutional capacity-building in the area of good governance as one of the six priority 
areas for EC development policy. Council conclusions on governance and development in 
September 2003 further operationalised this approach. The ESS states the following: 
   12  
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its 
foundation.  The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states.  Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights 
are the best means of strengthening the international order. 
 
  In all its agreements, the European Union negotiated as an essential clause (in terms of the 
Vienna Convention, i.e. allowing to suspend the agreement in case) that the respect of the 
principles of democracy and Human Rights underpin the internal and external policies of the 
parties. It is worth highlighting that this clause originated from  requests of Chile and Argentina  
in the  early 1990s, to protect themselves against any return to dictatorship. We are glad we did 
not have to apply it. 
 
Meanwhile, we added a clause on Good Governance.  Similar, more elaborate clauses 
figure in the Cotonou agreement with ACP, and were in the past applied i.e. on Haiti. Our 
agreements also include a clause on corruption, certainly a worldwide problem all societies have: 
but the effects of corruption are worse  the poorer a country is.  Nobody, and in particular not a 
democratically elected President should not be allowed to get away with hundreds of millions 
stolen from his people or received from drug traficking. Through such clauses, the European 
Union is aiming at a worldwide community, a global public opinion supporting democracy, 
human rights and good governance. 
  In recent EU-US consultations on Latin America in Washington, ASS Noriega stressed that 
Latin American governments, with income from trade, FDI and remittances have considerable 
means to pass through to their people, and that countries with good governance, like Chile, 
demonstrably show better performance – we cannot but agree! 
 
  In this context, we note an evolution which could have worrying effects on regional security, 
particularly but not only in the Andean area and Central America. Old elites and their parties lost 
confidence, and new, so far  excluded segments of society came to power. This is in its own  way 
a welcome proof of democracy, but highlights old and new problems which must be adressed 
urgently. Old elites are out of power, but still have structures links and experience.  New elites 
are in power, but lack efficient underlying structures and organisations. There are some  risks of 
undemocratic challenge for power  and frustration. True, there is some impact of effects of 
globalisation to which Latin American elites made important advance steps by opening up 
economies. But not all can be blamed on Globalisation.  The European Union tries to support 
good governance through the instruments I already mentioned: 
 
-  policy dialogue for defining priority areas on governance-related matters on the basis of  
  each partner country's priorities. 
 
-  development assistance including projects, sector programs, budget support and trade 
agreements. Budget support can be given where appropriate, for example to Bolivia, one 
of the main beneficiaries of EU ODA in Latin America: since 1976, this country received 
over 500 Meuros from the European Community alone (i.e. not counting aid by our 
individual Member States). In recent years, Bolivia got an  average 300 Meuros from EC 
and bilateral aid from Member States.   13  
 
  -  The Country Strategy Paper for 2002-06  foresees 126 million more; the European Union 
also contributes to the  actual budget deficit crisis.  
 
-  The "Country and Regional Strategy Papers" give the countries/regions concerned a clear 
view of what they can expect for a number of years, and for which priorities.  Some of 
these have recently been reoriented towards good governance and institution-building. 
These Papers are subject to mid-term reviews, and jointly established with sovereign 
partners who keep "ownership" of their national development strategies.    
 
Bolivia also benefitted from the HIPC Initiative: since 1998, it received 1,8 billion USD in 
debt relief.   Phil Chicola of the State Department stressed that the country, so rich in gas and 
more, does have  considerable resources -  it must use them and quickly decide so. To give a 
further example: as concerns Peru, at a donors' conference held in October 2001 in Madrid, the 
European Union pledged around 600 Million Euros in support of the Government's Social 
Emergency Programme "A Trabajar". 
 
  Let me end this chapter with a  reference to migration - often an outcome of insufficient 
development and  chances. The European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean have 
started a dialogue on this problem, a very real one: in Spain alone there are said to be  nearly half 
a million of  Ecuadorians.  Spain has started to legalise many foreigners at a rythm of up to 1,000 
a day. 
 
Equality, Social Cohesion 
 
As said above and highlighted by other speakers, social exclusion and inequality are time bombs. 
 
    I don't want to sound sanctimonious or paternalistic: fighting inequality and securing   
cohesive societies are overriding priorities not only for Latin America but for the European 
Union as well. For all our rhetoric about European social policy, visible and unacceptable 
inequalities also remain within European societies. Some 15% of EU inhabitants (56 million 
people) in 1999 were at risk of living in poverty and over half of those (33 million) suffered from 
a persistent risk of poverty. It takes me a 10 minutes walk from my house to enter Brussels' 
Thirld World; true, it does look different from  favelas or callampas. 
 
   But the problems of social cohesion are ever more acute in the Latin American continent. On 
a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents total inequality, Latin America sits at 53.9, much higher 
than the world's average (38), and even higher than Africa! The World Bank estimates that the 
richest 10% of the population of Latin America earn 48% of total income, while the poorest tenth 
earn only 1.6%. And as the Inter American Development Bank has pointed out, if income in 
Latin America were distributed just as it is in the countries of South East Asia, poverty in the 
region today would be only a fifth of what it actually is.  This is important not only on 
humanitarian grounds, but also as advise for practical, self-interested politics. Halving the 
population of poor people means doubling the size of the market; and strengthening the   14  
commitment of those who are currently marginalised by the democratic system. There is little 
dispute over the negative correlation between inequality and growth. 
 
    As a friendly observer, I believe Latin America can no longer put off social and fiscal 
measures that respond to the needs of a significant part of the population. In our cooperation 
programs, negotiated with beneficiaries, we respect a country's sovereignty - but this means in 
reverse, that how/if they want to develop is primarily their choice and responsability. 
International solidarity can be decisive, but not a substitute. The cynic definition of development 
aid of the 1960's " Taxing the poor in the rich countries to pay the rich in the poor countries" 
shall no longer apply. 
  
  The relation between sound economic performance and political stability is clear-cut, and 
works both ways. A worrying recent poll by the Latino Barometer indicated that 52% of the 
population in the continent felt that they could live under an authoritarian regime if it delivered 
better economic conditions for their daily lives. How to counter this? As former Brazilian 
president Henrique Cardoso said, governments should boost their effectiveness, and citizens 
must learn to demand their rights without violence. I couldn't agree more. 
  
Cardoso raises the two important questions:  
 
-  First, effectiveness.  It is not enough to set up democratic institutions; they must work.  
Electoral systems must function properly.  Political parties must be truly representative. 
Government policies should reflect a genuine social contract, which includes not just the 
protection of individual rights but also social solidarity to support the most vulnerable.  
The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. There are sometimes situations 
difficult to assess and to react to, namely when a democratically elected President  is 
obviously not respecting the rule of law. The  German/British  professor Lord Dahrendorf 
recently raised this dilemma - and concluded that, if a choice were to be made, rule of 
law should prevail. 
 
  -  The second question is the civil, peaceful exercise of political and social rights. In 
democratic societies there should be no place for violence. Citizens must feel confident in 
legal and institutional channels to exercise their rights. Violence and social turmoil can be 
symptoms of a lack of an effective political system. The resulting instability further 
discourages investment and growth. 
 
Regional Integration and the EU-LAC Bi-Regional Strategic Partnership 
 
 One way to tackle  social cohesion can be  regional integration. Economic integration will create 
a bigger market and attract more foreign investment, growing but fair competition, and greater 
negotiating clout. It  is also important for stability and conflict prevention. Closer co-operation 
can be a catalyst for democracy and improved human rights; regional integration is an expression 
of compatible, and even common objectives, giving priority to what unites us. 
 
  Regional integration reduces dependency and vulnerability, and offers protection against 
external shocks. Current trade between Latin American countries is weak and declining:   15  
according to the WTO, the percentage of intra-regional merchandise exports in Latin America 
fell by 10% in 2002; 7% in the Andean countries; and an alarming 33% in MERCOSUR. In 
2002, intra-regional exports in Latin America amounted to only 15.4% of total exports (and a 
mere 6.6% in the case of Peru), compared with 40.3% in North America, 48.9% in Asia, and 
67.3 percent in Western Europe. Unless this trend can be reversed, Latin American markets will 
continue to operate well below their potential. We probably need less Presidential conferences in 
Latin America and more seminars of experts on customs, trade nomenclature, single export 
forms etc. We need "efficient", not just legally valid decisions in integration, as Peru's MFA  
recently set out in his speech on Andean integration. To illustrate that individual Latin American 
countries have limited trading clout: Brazil is the number one trade partner for the European 
Union in Latin America, but globally  only our trade partner number fourteen. The European 
Union trades more with Vietnam than with Venezuela, more with Kazakhstan than with 
Colombia, more with Bangladesh than with Peru, more with Mauritius than with Ecuador, and 
more with Aruba than with Bolivia. 
  
Let me add that in the European experience, economic integration without accompanying 
measures for social and regional solidarity risks to create centres and marginalised areas, winners 
and loosers. Integration should not simply follow a commercial logic. The European Union is not 
the consequence of the market, but of political decisions. 
 
  The actual EU -Presidency, Ireland, is an outstanding example of the impact of the combined 
effect of our solidarity instruments and sound national policies for development. From some 65% 
of the EU average GDP per capita at the moment of accesion just 30 years ago, Ireland has 
skyrocketed to nearly 130%. The  European Union wants regional integration to be a win-win 
situation. It gives considerable advise and support to such processes in Latin America  .   
However, sometimes we feel like the preacher in the desert. 
 
   Our bi-regional Strategic Partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean was created at 
the First EU-LAC Summit 1999 in Rio, strongly promoted by Spain and Portugal, but with the 
support by all 15 and through a very active German EU-Presidency. This Partnership, as well as 
our agreements with Latin American countries and regions, including our FTA's are not silent on 
internal disparities.  Unlike NAFTA, they foresee manyfold cooperation sectors and instruments 
and aid over and above trade.  
 
  Our cooperation assistance ranges from projects on institutional support, customs 
harmonisation, technical norms and standards, statistical harmonisation, to the involvement of 
civil society. 
 
  Besides effective multilateralism, social cohesion is  the major item on the agenda of the 
Third EU-LAC Summit, to be held end of May in Guadalajara. In collaboration  with the World 
Bank, the Inter American Development Bank, the  UNDP, ECLAC, and  relevant experts, we 
drafted concrete proposals for policies fostering social cohesion for approval by our Heads of 
State Summit in Guadalajara, e.g. in areas like social and fiscal policy and regional and 
international co-operation.  Before the Summit, the European Commission intends to launch an 
additional  €30 million programme aimed at developing public administration networks, in 
particular in the sectors of justice, health, education and taxation.   16  
 
Let me end with a quote from the ESS: Working with partners: There are few if any 
problems we can deal with on our own.  The threats described above are common threats, shared 
with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity.  We need to pursue our 
objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through 
partnerships with key actors. 
 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable.  Acting together, the European Union and 
the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.  Our aim should be an 
effective and balanced partnership with the United States.  This is an additional reason for the 




NB: While this speech is very largely based on official EU policies and language, the overall 
responsability for the text is mine, and the opinions expressed in it do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Council of the European Union. 